he objective of social security is to protect the poor and vulnerable and to ensure that they have an acceptable standard of living. Social security may also entail smoothing consumption and reducing risk or spreading income over the life cycle. Often there is a redistribution of income among groups with differing needs.
In industrial countries social security is associated with such programs as pensions, unemployment, and health care, but these associations are not particularly helpful in assessing its role in developing countries. Experience is relevant to the extent that it provides a history of the preconditions and effects of some of the social security instruments that have evolved during this century. And it shows that policymakers have tried very different combinations of policies, which reflect different perceptions of need and vulnerability. The relevant policy will depend on identifying vulnerable groups as well as administrative and political constraints. Public policy is not synonymous with government provision, since there is clearly a role for local authorities as well as community action to help target scarce resources.
The first part of the article examines variations in social security programs in industrial nations and attempts to determine their effects. Comprehensive social security schemes may slow population growth, for example, but the effects are long term and quite complex. Similarly, the effect on savings has been the subject of considerable debate (see Atkinson 1987) . The inconclusiveness of this analysis-even with good data for developed countries and extensive models-suggests that it will be difficult to assess the effect of such programs in developing countries. But social security is not a preserve of the rich, and the governments of developing countries, in designing such programs, need to bear in mind the likely incentive effect. Ahmad and others (1990) argue that social security can be provided even in low-income countries and that it is as indispensable to an equitable development strategy as to economic growth. The second part of the article examines traditional social security mechanisms in developing countries and considers the role of the state in augmenting and formalizing these indigenous efforts. Although there are extensive formal programs in many Latin American countries, the cost of providing benefits is beginning to impose an intolerable burden on already stretched budgets (Mesa-Lago 1990) . In other countries, however, ranging from Brazil to China and India, aging populations, growing urbanization, and the rising number of nuclear families have weakened the traditional support provided by the family and increased the need for formal provision. Before governments expand their programs, however, it is important to reappraise the objectives of formal social security schemes and evaluate the most cost-effective forms of public intervention.
The third part of the article assesses the scope for formal social security in developing countries and examines whether these programs should be public or private. A number of instruments are likely to be needed, but the appropriate mix will differ from one developing country to another and will probably be substantially different from the programs in any developed country (see Atkinson and Hills 1990) .
The Evolution of Social Security in Industrial Countries
A study on social security (ILO 1984) describes three stages in its modern evolution. According to this view, the initial response was paternalistic: private charity and poor relief were provided for the indigent, but harsh conditions and stigma made this form of provision politically unacceptable. As a reaction, in the second phase, social insurance schemes were developed based on compulsory premia that entitled the participants to pensions and sick pay. In time, these programs were expanded to include wider coverage and more contingen-cies. In the third stage, the concepts of prevention and universality were introduced "with the aim of maintaining and enhancing the quality of life" (ILO 1984, p. 17) . Until the turn of the century, charity remained the mainstay for the poor in Europe, and in England charity was largely organized by the church. In 1834 the workhouse system was established under the Poor Law Amendment Act, an early example of a self-targeted provision (that is, a measure that automatically ensures that only eligible recipients will receive benefits). But the stigma attached to recipients excluded many of the needy, and in time, both the poor laws and charitable support of the disadvantaged came to be seen as inadequate and demeaning. Beveridge (1942) , the architect of the modern welfare state, notes that "since the beginning of the present century ... there has been a strong movement against the form and spirit of the old poor law" (p. 211).
The identification of age and infirmity as causes of poverty and deprivation led to the development of social insurance as an important policy instrument to guarantee minimum living standards and replace income in times of adversity. This insurance followed the precedents established by certain trades that had set up compulsory programs to provide pensions and sick pay for employees in the public sector and in some private sector occupations. In time, these compulsory programs were expanded to include more occupations and a wider range of contingencies. (In some countries the occupational origin of social security is still retained in the form of separate funds for various occupations.)
The evolution of different sets of policies that make up formal social security in industrial countries was a result of changing perceptions about who was vulnerable. These policies were also a political response to the need for stability, as was Bismarck's introduction of social insurance in Germany. Different configurations of interest groups influenced the direction of social security policies in industrial countries.
In Britain, for example, an old-age pensions act was introduced in 1908. The National Insurance Act followed in 1911. This legislation, which corresponded to Bismarck's reforms in Germany, provided pensions and sick pay to all workers. The law implied a fundamental change in philosophy, since it replaced means-tested benefits and assistance with social insurance. But not until after the Great Depression, in 1934, did Britain pass an unemployment act to provide general assistance for all unemployed workers. And the public response to battlefield deaths after the outbreak of World War II prompted the introduction of means-tested supplementary provisions for widows.
The Beveridge proposal was to make national insurance coverage universal and reduce dependence on assistance, given "the strength of popular objection to any kind of means test" (Beveridge 1942, p. 12) . As a precondition for the success of the reform, Beveridge argued for the inclusion of "family allowances," which were neither social insurance nor means-tested benefits and which included basic benefits for children. Although not all of the Beveridge proposals were accepted, the main idea was adopted, and the government projected an 82 percent increase in social security as a share of total assistance programs by 1975. The share of family allowances would account for about 12 percent of the total, largely at the expense of means-tested assistance (which made up 100 percent of public welfare at the turn of the century). But although the government increased the scope of social insurance after 1949, there was a decline in the share of basic benefits over time and a rise in means-tested assistance for basic benefits from 1.1 million payments a week in 1949 to 2.7 million in 1969-70 (Atkinson 1989) . Since 1979 there has been a marked decline in the real level of basic benefits as well as in national insurance. Means-tested assistance, which accounted for about 10 percent of social security expenditures in 1969-70, increased to more than 30 percent by 1985, which reflects stringent new measures to determine eligibility, including more rigorous screening, more detailed evidence of income, and more reliance on established tests. This experience suggests that the stages predicted by ILO (1984) are not inevitable. Instead of moving to the third phase, Britain, at least, appears to be regressing.
Formal social security policies differ markedly among industrial countries, depending on the objectives of the government. Because most systems involve combinations of measures, and because there are often substantial interactions that determine whether the basic objective of protecting the vulnerable has been achieved, it can be misleading to evaluate the overall effect by focusing on one program. The essential test of a social security system is how well it pays benefits to the intended target groups. Thus in the case of income poverty, it is necessary to examine to what degree social security provisions contribute to a reduction in poverty. A failure to meet the objective suggests inadequacies in design. For instance, when benefits are based on a set of contingencies, coverage may not include all the eligible poor. Thus in countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), where social security was first developed to fight poverty among the aged and disabled, there has been a growing concern about the incidence of poverty in families with children (see Burtless 1986 for a discussion on the United States).
The Luxembourg Income Study suggests that 24 percent of elderly Americans were poor in 1979. This figure fell to 12 percent in 1987 as a direct result of the growth in social security retirement benefits in the United States. The proportion of children living in poverty, however, has remained constant, at a fifth of all U.S. children. In Britain, however, where retirement benefits have been declining, more than a third of the elderly were poor in 1979, but only 9 percent of the children were poor (Coder and others 1989) . (Universal family allowances in Britain include benefits for children, whereas those in the United States do not.)
The concern with targeting social security effectively is relevant in the OECD as well as in developing countries, given rising costs, growing budget deficits, and the political sensitivities associated with the "middle-class capture" of benefits (see LeGrand and Winter 1987) . Efficient targeting (see Weisbrod 1969) involves not only covering only those in the target group (vertical efficiency) but also including all individuals in the target group (horizontal efficiency). Unfortunately, there is a tension between these two aspects of targeting, and ensuring vertical efficiency by stringent means testing often adversely affects horizontal efficiency. It is not clear how worrying vertical inefficiency may be. As noted in the following section, the interaction of the tax and social security systems may permit the government to "claw back" the benefits from middle-class beneficiaries. What is important is to examine the overall tax and benefits system.
The Effect of Formal Social Security Programs
Theoretical and econometric work on the effect of social security on behavior in industrial countries has focused on the inefficiencies-such as in the decision to work-generated by social welfare programs and on possible adverse effects of government pensions on the accumulation of capital. Other studies question whether there has been a reduction in the private transfers that might otherwise have taken place and whether social security displaces private savings.
In the labor market, questions about participation in the work force, number of hours worked, and age of retirement have come under scrutiny. For employers, the level of social security contributions required affects decisions on hiring and laying off workers and on whether to hire part-or full-time staff. The evidence, however, is somewhat inconclusive. Atkinson (1987) , in his review of the econometric literature, notes that seven studies of pensions in the United States used the same Longitudinal Retirement History Survey. Four studies found that pensions had a significant effect on the decision to retire, and three found that pensions were insignificant or economically unimportant factors in the choice. Atkinson suggests that the models probably reflected the activities of a subset of the population (white, married, working males) and that the retirement decisions of the black, single, female, or self-employed were not represented.
Many studies suggest that government social security programs have had negative effects, but this outcome may derive in part from inappropriately designed programs. If this is so, developing countries considering similar options should carefully assess program design. A case in point is unemployment insurance, under which unconditional benefits are likely to encourage a longer job search and delay reentry into the job market. Atkinson (1987) suggests that unemployment benefits should not be unconditional. If regulations specify the amount a worker must contribute and require the worker to look for a job, and if the duration of benefits is limited, there may be a greater incentive to rejoin the labor market. Employment guarantee schemes are a nonexclusive alternative to unemployment insurance in poor countries or those undergoing structural change, as in Eastern Europe.
Evidence also warns against adopting certain measures that have been ineffective, such as income-tax deductions for children. As the value of the deductions increases with the marginal tax rate, the richest taxpayers benefit most. This concession is likely to be highly regressive and can be replaced by better-targeted transfers directed at children. The connections among policies should make it possible to foresee and offset any negative effects of particular options.
Lessons for Developing Countries
The notion of three stages in the evolution of social security systems (ILO 1984 ) is likely to be misleading-or at best irrelevant-if used as a guide to policy. To have had extensive experience in the public provision of social security and in the administration of a welfare state is no guarantee that the system will progress from one stage to another. This may be seen in the recent policy changes in Britain. Nor is it necessary to wait until a country reaches a particular level of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita before introducing social security measures.
Another important lesson from the experience of industrial countries is that the interaction among various programs has implications for the overall design of social security systems. Thus financing assistance through the general tax structure in addition to earmarked wage and payroll taxes might result in unexpectedly high marginal tax rates, with undesirable consequences. Furthermore, the interaction among formal social security and other programs may also have important financial implications. Governments need to examine whether it would be cheaper to act to avoid the contingency of unemployment or sickness, for example, or to pay for unemployment insurance and health benefits. This brings into sharp focus the relation between social security and food relief, intervention in the labor market, and other health and education programs.
Finally, it should be noted that the methods of analysis and the modeling techniques that have been used to examine the costs and benefits of various programs will prove to be valuable in the context of developing countries.
Social Security in Developing Countries
Public policy to ensure social security in developing countries should be based on what individuals and households do to protect themselves, particularly in revenue-constrained economies. This means examining savings behavior and smoothing fluctuations in consumption, as well as assessing transfers and support mechanisms provided by the extended family or community. There is evidence that the poor, whose incomes are seldom above subsistence level, are able to cope with some fluctuations in income. But their ability to accumulate and liquidate assets, or to rely on family and friends, is limited, particularly in the case of major and repeated shocks.
Traditional Social Security
For such contingencies as old age, the family is the principal source of support in societies as diverse as rural China (see Ahmad and Hussain 1990) , India, and Sub-Saharan Africa. This dependence typically reinforces the need for sons and sharply limits the prospects for lowering the birthrate. Problems arise when there are no male offspring or when there is a breakdown in filial concern, given the constraints of nuclear families. Iliffe (1987) notes that in many parts of Africa the word for poor is synonymous with that for the lack of kin or friends.
Support for the indigent who have no family assistance tends to be based on community-level welfare and food security. In the Gambia, for instance, food for the needy and indigent is based on the Islamic precept of zakat (an earmarked levy on wealth, sometimes provided to the mosque). In addition, a system of labor transfers provides half the total labor at the community level (von Braun 1990) . This local provision is very effective in identifying the indigent, and it is relatively costless. Since resources are generally locally provided, however, events that affect the whole community make it less likely that the indigent will be covered in times of stress. Thus some degree of risk pooling across regions or over time is desirable.
At the community level there are many fairly sophisticated survival strategies that are equivalent to social security. Such informal schemes are found in traditional fishing villages, which are among the poorest communities in many parts of Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa (see Platteau 1990) . Fishing is a high-risk occupation. Daily income is subject to abrupt variation (production risks are often independent of price risks), and fishermen also risk the loss of-or damage to-their lives and assets. Because the work is so physically demanding, fishermen have relatively short working lives.
The high probability of low or zero catches precludes the payment of fixed wages. For the same reason, a fixed rental contract would not be attractive to the fishermen. Instead, the wage system is based on share contracts. Such contracts, which divide the catch (often fifty-fifty), provide insurance to both owners and fishermen. Furthermore, a form of sickness coverage is provided equivalent to one share (or half a share) of the current income of the fishing unit (a benefit often observed in Sub-Saharan Africa). Many small-scale fisheries also provide for the subsistence needs of old fishermen or of poor families that have lost all of their male income-earners. Preempting the rights of the indigent resembles an informal tax system designed for a social security purpose. In Kerala, India, risk pooling also takes the form of interest-free loans to needy households. This transfer can be reciprocal because the loss of fishing income is uncorrelated among the various boats. The important feature is that surplus earners give free credit in anticipation of future contingencies. The moral reciprocity commitment implicit in the acceptance of free credit is enforced by the community.
The most important social insurance mechanism at work in small-scale fisheries-particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa-is the practice of sharing income by offering employment. In Senegal, owners and crews often accommodate unemployed fishermen despite the evident reduction in income. The workers' (and possibly the owners') remuneration varies inversely with the firm's level of employment.
The drought in western Sudan shows the vulnerability of traditional social security practices. Family-and community-based survival strategies that were effective in 1980 and for a time thereafter weakened by 1984. In the worst-hit villages, self-help mechanisms such as communal work parties, gift giving, village emergency funds, and annual contributions to the poor broke down completely. In better-endowed villages, emergency funds-usually collected by taxing sales of subsidized government sugar-were used to support survival strategies, such as transporting villagers to seek work (Teklu and von Braun 1989) .
These examples show relatively sophisticated social security mechanisms that incorporate aspects of redistribution and insurance operating in poor communities. But the resources for such schemes are locally based, and the practices cannot withstand sustained shocks. Moreover, the social cohesion that underlies these arrangements is increasingly susceptible to the challenges of contemporary society. There is a role for the state to provide formal social security by pooling risks across localities. Given stringent fiscal constraints, however, it is important to effectively target formal social security mechanisms to reinforce rather than supplant traditional support mechanisms.
Formal Social Security
Developing countries have had a variety of experiences with formal social security designed to provide for such contingencies as sickness, old age, and unemployment. Since governments typically face budget constraints, the choice of policy is of central importance. But expenditures for the poorest and those at risk from starvation need not involve a tradeoff with investments in human capital or the generation of assets. In many developing countries defense spending often accounts for between a third and a half of current budget expenditure, and this expenditure is usually at the expense of programs that benefit the poor. Table 1 shows that most Asian, North African, and OECD countries spend more than 3 percent of GDP on defense. Although this percentage is considerably lower than that devoted to welfare, assistance, and social security in industrial countries and Latin America, it is more than most other developing countries spend to protect vulnerable groups. Some developing countries subsidize inefficient industries and prestige projects at great cost. Despite some leeway-which may involve reallocating domestic expenditures as well as aidbudgets are not unlimited, and social welfare programs have to be financed from domestic resources.
An early example of a formal social security system that generates its own resources is zakat, the Islamic provision for the indigent, the financing for GDP, 1975 GDP, , 1984 GDP, 1975 GDP, 1984 which is obtained by the tax on wealth mentioned earlier. For agricultural land there is a tithe (ushr), which carries the benefits of insurance, redistribution, and moral suasion. Local administration makes it more likely that the tax will be paid and that only the indigent (for instance, unsupported widows, orphans, and the aged) will receive payments. Since land taxes have not been particularly important in this century, there is some scope for raising additional revenue if the funds are earmarked for local social security, and not for general government expenditure.
EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEES AND UNEMPLOYMENT. Creating employment as a response to economic shocks has been a long-standing element of public policy throughout the world. During recessions and other crises, governments in industrial countries have often set up public works programs to assist the unemployed. Britain implemented such schemes in the face of economic recession and food shortages at the turn of the century, and the United States followed suit in the 1930s. Because insurance and credit markets often provide little protection against deprivation in developing countries, intervention in the labor market is often used to prevent destitution. Such schemes address a significant cause of poverty, provide rapid assistance to the most needy through selfselection, and can be designed to improve infrastructure.
Two countries, India and Chile, have successfully implemented such programs. Maharashtra offers a striking example of an employment guarantee scheme. When an extended drought in 1972-73 cut cereal production by 50 percent, the government established a relief program based on employment and cash transfers. Employment was restricted to unskilled manual work. Those unable to work and without able-bodied relatives were eligible for relief. The current program builds on the original famine policy, but it provides year-round guaranteed employment. In essence, the scheme combines income with an insurance component. Since agricultural production is highly variable, the guarantee provides coverage for these situations as well as for sudden or unexpected shocks.
In 1987-88 the government of Maharashtra created 150 million man-days of employment at a cost of 2.6 billion rupees (11 to 12 percent of state expenditures). Part of the financing was provided by levies on professions and earmarked taxes on sales and motor vehicles. These taxes, which are generated primarily in urban areas, provided 35 percent of the funds required. The employment guarantee scheme has a significant element of redistribution from such industrial cities as Bombay to rural and poorer municipal areas.
An interesting feature of the scheme is that it attempts to generate productive assets. The government maintains a roster of eligible projects, with priority given to infrastructure and other risk-reducing activities, such as soil and water conservation, reforestation, road works, and flood protection. Local supervisors oversee the programs. Assistance is perceived as a right, and this strong tradition mobilizes political support and a tight administrative structure, which includes supervision and evaluation.
With an open-ended guarantee such as Maharashtra's, targeting is necessary. The government has achieved this targeting through the self-selection mecha-nisms of relatively low wages and hard manual labor. A low minimum wage, payable in cash and in subsidized grain, is guaranteed. The location of projects and the periodicity of payments encourage the participation of the poorest segments of the population. About 40 percent of the recipients are women, who are paid the same wage rates as men (Echeverri-Gent 1988) . Higher wages would erode the self-targeting aspects of the scheme (a factor to be considered as nationwide implementation in India is under way, and there is evidence of some leakage of benefits to nontarget groups).
The Programas de Empleo (EEP), instituted in 1974, was Chile's approach to self-targeted employment. Although Chile already had one of the most extensive formal social security systems in the developing world, the program played an important role during two major crises. During the 1974-77 shock, the index of real wages per capita (1970 equals 100) declined to 61 in 1974 61 in and 54 in 1975 61 in and 1976 61 in . In 1976 the EEP employed about 6 percent of the labor force at a time when unemployment was 16 percent. Unemployment fell in subsequent years, but the government maintained the EEP at the same level until 1982, when Chile was forced to adjust again. The index of real earnings fell from 96 in 1981 to 69 in 1982, and unemployment climbed to 21 percent. The EEP was doubled in 1983 to cover 13 percent of the labor force (together with unemployment, this amounted to 31 percent of the work force). Because the EEP was self-selecting, the total budgetary cost was only 1.4 percent of gross national product at the height of the crisis in 1983. A survey suggests that the majority of workers in two of the main schemes were in the lowest income quintile. The EEP was gradually run down as the labor market tightened and was withdrawn completely in 1988, when unemployment returned to about 6 percent.
These programs illustrate the possibilities for social security in the face of short-term economic and agricultural shocks. Both programs perform the function of unemployment insurance common in industrial countries. The selftargeting helps reduce disincentives to work, which feature prominently in the discussion of unemployment in industrial countries, and also limits budgetary outlays. To this extent such programs are also part of the formal programs discussed in the following section. SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALTERNATIVES. Concern for the care of the elderly and disabled has been an important factor in the development of social security institutions in industrial countries. Providing for an aging population is easier if the program starts when the number of retirees relative to the working population is still small. Models incorporating the dynamics of population and sectoral change can evaluate the medium-term costs of particular options. Formal care for the elderly in many developing countries can be compared with the need for coverage in Britain when old-age pensions were introduced. At the beginning of the century 5 percent of the British population was age sixty-five or older. This ratio at present is estimated to be 4.1 percent in India and 5.9 percent in China (6.5 percent and 9 percent, respectively, are older than sixty in the two countries). The proportion of the population older than sixty-five in 2030 is projected to be 8.1 percent in India and 14 percent in China (12.5 percent and 21 percent are over sixty). The numbers in China are staggering, rising to more than 220 million older than sixty-five by 2020. The proportion of the population older than sixty-five in some Latin American countries by 2030 is projected to be even higher: 8.6 percent in Argentina, 10 percent in Brazil, and 11 percent in Uruguay.
The Latin American countries, with relatively mature social security programs and aging populations, present an interesting set of issues. At first most countries offered full funding of social insurance through trust funds that generated surpluses when the number of retirees was small in relation to the working population. These surpluses eroded over time as the trusts were forced to buy government paper at below-market interest rates as well as by inappropriate investments. The practice of cross-subsidizing overruns on expensive health care with surpluses from the retirement accounts, along with the proliferation of benefits conferred when the schemes were in surplus, depleted the trusts. The schemes have now become mainly pay-as-you-go, with relatively high contribution rates. Table 2 shows that the combined contributions of workers, employers, and the government are more than 30 percent of the wage bill in many countries. Thus further increases in the payroll tax may not be desirable. High contribution rates lead to evasion, which reduces the base for social security and increases the incentive to hire workers from the informal sector (who then do not have coverage either).
During inflation, when contributions are not indexed and benefits are, general revenues could come under pressure to meet the projected deficits of the social security system. This is not a particularly easy problem to resolve, given existing budgetary deficits and the inability to raise fresh taxes. Nor is it likely to be equitable to rely primarily on general revenues, which affect the whole population (including the very poor), whereas social security benefits accrue largely to employees in the formal sector, who are likely to be better-off in any case. The solution to this set of issues entails examining the entire system of benefits, funding, and taxes, and the implications for the population as a whole. The prospect of increasing coverage to expand the contribution rate relative to liabilities is limited, since coverage is almost universal in such mature states as Chile and Costa Rica.
Mesa-Lago (1990) argues that Latin American countries that have the widest social insurance coverage also have the most progressive incidence of the benefits of social security. A few countries have managed to extend coverage beyond the formal urban sector, either because they have a modern unionized rural sector (as in Chile and Costa Rica) or because new methods of finance were designed based on agricultural taxes and a redistribution from the formal urban sector. Thus in Brazil low-income rural residents are eligible for primary health care and minimum pensions; Costa Rica, Uruguay, and some Caribbean countries provide noncontributory pensions and health care for indigents. In countries with relatively low coverage, social security is more inequitable. In Colombia, where only 16 percent of the population is covered, employers and the state provide most of the finance. The often argued need for a close correspondence between contributions and benefits leads to a discrimination between the users of social insurance and the recipients of public assistance. This correspondence is a significant barrier to the extension of the social security system.
In China, income maintenance and social security have been successfully provided (see Ahmad and Hussain 1990) at relatively low levels of income through enterprise-based employment guarantees in urban areas in conjunction with strict controls on mobility. Enterprises also provide pensions, housing, and health care in urban areas for more than 100 million people, along with rations of essential food and consumer goods. Although these guarantees ensure minimum living standards for a large proportion of the urban population, the enterprise-based system has been a severe constraint on the pace of economic reform in China. The continuation of reforms in China (as in other centrally planned economies) depends greatly on whether economywide social insurance can effectively replace enterprise-based provision.
With the introduction of the responsibility system after 1979, enterprises had to be relieved of the burden of supporting retired workers (the ratio of workers to dependents was often as high as one to one in some older enterprises). This issue has become an essential ingredient in making firms responsive to the price mechanism. Furthermore, the possibility of bankruptcy can be made functional only if the enterprises do not carry excessive nonproduction costs and if the income of unemployed workers can be protected by unemployment insurance. Unemployment insurance is generally limited in duration. In a period of structural change, with a substantial expansion of unemployment, self-targeted employment provision is likely to be the only cost-effective method of providing for the transitionally unemployed.
In rural areas of China the extended family provides much of the old-age support. There is also a system for distressed individuals (widows, orphans, and the elderly without family or kin support) called wu bao (five guarantees). As with Victorian poor relief, the emphasis has been more on preventing the nonpoor from getting relief than on ensuring that all of the eligible are covered. There is a severe social stigma attached to wu bao that restricts take-up rates. Thus rural social security essentially remains based on the ability to work and on the support of sons in old age (Jia 1988, Ahmad and Hussain 1990) . One of the major objectives of wu bao, which was to restrict population growth by providing an alternative to family support, has not been achieved. Although China's public policy had not focused on providing support to poor individuals in rural areas, a system of regional targeting effectively supplied grain to chronically poor areas. This policy was effective before 1978 because there was little mobility across regions and considerable equality within 00 Table 2 . Social Insurance and Social Security Financing, 1983, 1987 n.a. Not applicable. Note: Data are for salaried employees; the self-employed pay a much higher percentage. a. Includes public health care in countries with national health systems. b. Surplus is defined as the excess of legal contributions and receipts over expenditures expressed as a percentage of receipts. In most cases it is difficult to disentangle those payments made on behalf of public sector employees and those in which a deficit is being financed through additional taxes or general revenues. Only unambiguous deficit coverage is indicated by (d).
c. communes. Thus identifying a poor county was an effective way to target poor people. In recent years, however, regional inequalities have increased (see Ahmad and Wang 1989) . The use of regional targeting thus means that some of the nonpoor are likely to benefit, and the poor in better-off counties tend to be missed. China faces a significant problem in providing an effective safety net for workers in informal and service activities who are not covered by the formal labor insurance system, as well as for the increasing number of employees in township and village enterprises. The wu bao system is incapable of providing for individuals on a large scale. But extending coverage is not without benefits, since an expansion of the base spreads the risk and ensures better intergenerational redistribution. With the increase in life expectancy and the rapid growth in the number of indigent, considerations of equity will dictate important changes in China's social security system. This lesson applies as well to other centrally planned economies in the process of reform.
Formal social security coverage in countries such as India is fairly patchy. Guhan (1988) observes that formal sector (mainly public) employees are covered by reasonable sickness, maternity, pension, and survivor benefits, as well as with subsidized housing. In addition, public employees are not vulnerable to unemployment. Self-employed and informal sector workers, however, who constitute nearly 90 percent of earners, get virtually no benefit from social insurance or social assistance. Even in the industrial sector, evasion, defects in legislation, inadequacies in coverage, and difficulties in enforcement delay or deny benefits to those entitled. State-level pensions, designed to provide benefits to those below the poverty line, also suffer from shortcomings. Guhan notes that pensions cover probably no more than a fifth of the old people under the poverty line who should qualify for these pensions. There are great differences in coverage across states. For instance, rural widows are likely to be among the most vulnerable groups in India, but only rarely, as in Kerala, is there a formal pension provision for widows. The level of coverage in most states is low partly because eligible beneficiaries lack information, but also because of restrictive qualifying conditions relating to age, destitution, and domicile and because of ad hoc financial ceilings. Furthermore, Guhan concludes, corruption and procedural delays restrict access. The main concern is how to devise an effective social security system that can be targeted to relevant groups without excessive exclusion. This will require employment guarantees as well as local identification and care for the indigent or those unable to participate in the labor market.
A number of instruments are likely to be important for effective social security in most developing countries. These range from employment guarantees (in lieu of or in addition to unemployment benefits) even in countries with established formal systems, such as Chile, to social insurance for basic health care and retirement in countries with a large formal sector, such as China and India. Local redistributive mechanisms, whether community-level or based on families, particularly in urban areas, are likely to restrict the effectiveness of family-based care.
That the provision of charity contributes to the public good (in the sense that private transfers produce externalities) is well known, since the benefits do not accrue to the persons making the transfer. Moreover, "we might all of us be willing to contribute to the relief of poverty, provided everyone else did. We might not be willing to contribute the same amount without such assurance" (Friedman 1962, p. 191) . There is thus a considerable scope for everyone being made better-off by the state through different forms of intervention as well as through direct income support.
As already noted, the main elements that are relevant in choosing between public and private alternatives in a developing country are administrative costs, adverse selection, and moral hazard. If administrative costs are lower for private insurance than for public provision, privatization would be less costly for the insured and would eliminate distortions for those unable to afford private insurance. But government schemes may have the advantages of economies of scale, lower advertising costs, and so on.
Although these arguments assume that perfect competition is sustainable in the insurance market, a competitive equilibrium may not exist, given adverse selection (where the probability of the event is known to the individual but not to the company). Thus "pooling equilibria" may not be stable, in the sense that when the premium is based on the expected claims for the population, high-risk individuals will take out insurance and low-risk individuals will not. And as Spence (1978) noted, if separate premia are devised, policies designed for low-risk individuals would be bought by high-risk customers, thus introduciing negative externalities based on information. This adverse selection is one of the reasons elderly Americans cannot easily buy medical insurance. As "the price of insurance rises the people who insure themselves will be those who are increasingly certain that they will. need the insurance" (Akerlof 1970, p. 492) . One solution is to make insurance compulsory to ensure that low-risk purchasers do not opt out. The inefficiencies involved may be far less than under the alternative.
A more serious problem is that of moral hazard, when individuals can influence the probability of the insured event in a way that cannot be monitored by the insurance company. Voluntary unemployment is a common example. This again leads to a breakdown in the market for insurance.
Considerable work on insurance markets examines alternative situations, including separating equilibria (with different contracts for higher-or lower-risk groups), and equilibrium with mixed strategies. But "the central message is in the fact that the market for insurance is unlikely to be perfectly competitive" (Atkinson 1989, p. 116) . This brings into question the relevance of the private alternative even in industrial countries.
Given that administrative costs make up a significant part of formal social security systems, the choice between public and private provision has to take formal tax and allocation mechanisms, will require an element of central government support to insure against covariate risks. The government's ability to identify the vulnerable and needy as well as political and administrative constraints will determine the effectiveness of the system.
Prospects for Formal Social Security
Governments need to evaluate the objectives of social security and decide whether to rely on public or private insurance. In addition, the difficulties of administering these programs, particularly in the informal sector, cannot be overemphasized. Agricultural and self-employed workers are hard to trace. It is difficult to keep track of people who move back and forth and whose work histories are not on record. Similarly, distributing benefits to these recipients is a challenge. Thus governments need to look at the consequences of alternative policies for incentives, government budgets, and households in different circumstances.
Public or Private?
The public provision of formal social security has been criticized by observers on the right and the left of the political spectrum. The former argue that the public sector is incapable of an efficient response and that it would be preferable to turn to private insurance and rely on the market. One of the principal effects of state-financed social security, however, is the universal reduction in uncertainty. For some risks, such as industrial accidents, the probability and costs are assessable and private insurance may be provided on an actuarial basis. But problems of moral hazard and adverse selection may prompt a different response from the government and the private sector. Moreover, private insurance does not apply to such events as calamities, unemployment, and a breakdown of family support for the aged.
Traditionally, the family has played a major role in providing security in most countries, and it continues to perform the same function today. In many parts of the world, these intergenerational transfers have led to pressures to produce male offspring. The resulting effects on population growth are well known, as is the tendency for an unequal distribution of entitlements within the family. When support is lacking, the community typically provides insurance, either through a system of gifts and mutual obligations or through welldefined power relations, such as those between landlords and tenants that sometimes guarantee employment and entitlements. Such arrangements are localized and do not offer the advantages of pooling risk across regions or climatic zones. Thus in major crises, such as widespread losses in entitlements, social security measures at both the community and the family level are likely to be insufficient. Furthermore, migration and the proliferation of nuclear into account not only the relative costs but also such issues as market structure. There are a number of hybrid alternatives. One is the Swedish system of notionally private unemployment insurance. The system is state regulated, and 90 percent of the funding comes from the government, although the administration is private. "The system is therefore more usefully regarded as a public scheme whose administration has been hived off to the private sector" (Barr 1987, p. 16) .
There is also a trend in many countries to encourage private insurance for the well-to-do, supplemented by social insurance for the rest of the population. This option is likely to have a major drawback, in that private insurers may cream off all but the highest-cost groups, making social insurance excessively expensive and insufficiently diverse (Spence 1978) . A further issue that private insurance does not address is the redistribution of income that is inherent in the social insurance system. This question leads to an investigation of the interface between social insurance and tax policy.
Alternative Public Programs
Developing countries have had to devise ways to target benefits to reach the poor, who are not covered by formal social insurance. The alternatives are to rely on means-tested benefits, particularly at the local level, where identification is less of a problem, and on benefits that are independent of a contributory framework, possibly targeted to particular groups such as children or the elderly.
The literature on optimum taxation, relating to the choice of the tax schedule (Atkinson 1987 (Atkinson , 1989 Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980) , is useful in assessing means testing. The provision of a uniform benefit shifts the budget constraint such that the marginal tax rate remains zero below the tax threshold. If a means-tested benefit is provided to individuals below the threshold and is completely withdrawn as incomes rise above the threshold, such individuals face a 100 percent marginal tax rate on benefits. The choice is thus between a rising marginal tax rate at the bottom of the schedule, with social insurance, and a falling marginal tax rate, with means-tested transfers. Similar issues arise in the choice between income testing and basic benefit schemes, and these involve balancing the objectives of efficiency and distribution. If the decisions of the low-income groups relating to work, savings, and so on are unaffected by the marginal tax rate and do not affect the private provision of insurance, or private transfers, then full withdrawal of benefits would be desirable. If, however, these decisions are distorted in some way, then the rate of withdrawal would depend on the efficiency cost of the distortion relative to greater target efficiency. The desirability of either falling or rising marginal tax rates depends on the specification of the problem, and it is not possible to be categorical about either ex ante.
This discussion concerns the form of the benefit. Equally important hurdles are the administration and costs of determining eligibility, both in time spent gathering information, filing for benefits, and examining claims, and in the stigma that is often associated with such claims. Means testing often brings about incomplete take-up of benefits (although this can arise without means testing). This result is seen as an advantage by some planners, who advocate ordeals as a means of improving target efficiency, and it is common, for instance, in many food-for-work programs. But to ensure that all eligible recipients receive benefits requires local information and identification. Regional targeting to provide for all individuals in specific poor regions may well be cost-effective and could be an important supplement to social security where regional deprivation is identifiable. China's experience shows the need for such an option and its limitations.
Certain transfer schemes are prone to abuse, and the possibility of fraudulent claims has to be addressed. To some extent this is the reason that selfselecting targeting mechanisms, such as inferior-quality rations or work tests, are used. But how administrators are rewarded also affects overall arrangements. For instance, it matters whether rewards to administrators are based on reaching target groups or on considerations of cost. If cost is the criterion, officials may save money by not reaching target groups.
If it is the citizen's right to be provided for by the state, basic benefits could be targeted to all the elderly or to families with children. Thus a redistributive arrangement to provide a pension equal to the poverty line (140 rupees a retiree in India, 250 yuan in China) to all those over sixty-five in India and China would amount to less than 2 percent of GDP. More targeted versions, with benefits accruing only to the indigent over sixty-five, would have to be based on local information and administration. Under both options, a redistributive guarantee could be provided to the indigent and the most vulnerable without precluding additional insurance (social or otherwise) for those who desire it. The government would not be obligated to provide this insurance, which would free resources for other productive activities or for benefits to vulnerable groups.
The strategy of providing basic benefits avoids the costs associated with determining a person's employment status and means. It can also supplement social insurance by providing funds for low-income workers (Atkinson 1989) . If basic benefits are provided at a level that does not induce withdrawal from the labor force, a properly targeted social insurance scheme, say for sickness or unemployment, would have no adverse income effects on labor supply (see the analysis of tagging in Akerlof 1978) . The standard issues are, first, if the transfers are adequate to live on, there will be incentive problems, and, second, the arithmetic dictates that the tax rate will be high. This points to combining policies to make the social security system effective. Political choices and administrative constraints are likely to determine the final outcome.
Conclusion
Effective social security requires a number of policy instruments. But not all of the policies used in industrial countries are relevant for developing countries. Thus administrative constraints and the effects on incentives to work dictate that unemployment insurance may be inappropriate even in the more advanced developing countries with established formal programs. This does not mean that nothing can be done. Self-selecting employment schemes can provide a basic safety net and also be designed to retain workers and add to productive infrastructure. Formal programs to protect vulnerable groups, such as the sick and the aged, are also likely to have positive long-term consequences, reducing uncertainty and lessening the demand for larger families. To some extent, these programs as well as social insurance schemes are likely to be financed by contributions and by pooling risks across generations and groups. These contributions would not generally accrue to government revenues. The experience with social insurance, however, suggests that it is a function of formal sector employment. Minimum noncontributory pensions targeted solely by age would need to be funded through general revenues. Further targeting at the local level to identify the indigent may also be possible. Such programs could build on community arrangements where they exist but would depend on local administration and financing. 
